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1. Institutional Conceptualization of Democracy
This chapter deals with theoretical conceptualizations of empirical changes in democratic 
political systems. The world is changing in different ways; some areas see the rise of 
parliamentary democracy; some see apparent democracy but in actual fact they experience 
autarchy or despotism; some become part of supranational cooperation while others attempt to 
close their borders. Since there is no overall pattern to be found, we must restrict the task, and I 
chose to discuss some changes in Western liberal, mainly European, democracies and link those 
changes to institutional theory.  
So the research question is: How do institutionalists understand what is happening to democracy 
under change in the Western democracies? National organizations - parliaments, interest 
organizations, state bureaucracies - grew in strength during much of the 20th century and 
established a specific order among them. Now they seem to be weakening in many states and 
new forms of organizing1 are appearing. It seems that, conceptually, these countries are changing 
from being understood in terms of one overriding concept - parliamentary democracy within 
nation-states - to being characterized by a plurality of democratic channels, possibly competing 
with one another for influence. Since democracy may be analyzed in institutional terms, 
institutionalists within political science have the task to conceptualize the changes and come up 
with satisfactory analyses and explanations.   
In general terms, we shall discuss changes at two levels. Within some nations we witness a move 
from grand-scale aggregative democracy, which focus on political bodies handling general 
societal problems, to small-scale integrative democracy, which creates smaller publics for more 
specific problems. At the international level, however, there is a movement towards larger 
international regimes which reduce the role of the nation-state in questions concerning individual 
rights and the market, while they keep some national leverage in questions of redistribution and 
economic development. 
These changes lead to increasing variety in democratic systems and channels. International 
regimes provide new input from the EU, Human rights and so on Particularized public sub-
national channels provide citizens with new channels of influence, re-organizing the public 
                                                 
1 ”Organizing” is used as a substantive to stress an understanding of dynamic and processual terms, in contrast to 
”organization”. 
sector and enhancing citizen influence in their roles as users. Acknowledgment of alternate 
values in public solutions of welfare creates diversification produced by third sector 
organizations and various movements. Cultures which stretch across borders are gaining 
strength, allowing for some degree of regionalism, the Basques are but one example.  
In the academy, new theoretical concepts compete to structure our thinking about democracy. 
They are not clear-cut alternatives. Some prominent examples are deliberative democracy; 
associative democracy, and other ways of organizing based on civil society; and international or 
cosmopolitan democracy. These concepts relate in various ways to the "new" empirical channels 
of influence. 
Below we shall first focus our attention on two particular institutional conceptualizations - the 
aggregative and the integrative - of democratic affairs. Some empirical evidence of trends within 
democracy in Western countries is then discussed, and three recent forms of democracy are 
singled out for closer inspection. This leads us to a discussion of how institutional theory has 
been helpful in understanding developments within democracy. 
 
2. Institutional theory of democracy
Institutionalism has become a comprehensive heading, and there is hardly agreement about how 
many schools of institutionalism we may find. Among those who want to synthesize, B. Guy 
Peters has found seven (Peters 1999), but many want to reduce the number to three (Dimaggio 
1998), namely: Rational Choice Institutionalism; Organizational or Sociological Institutionalism 
and Historical Institutionalism - each of those may be labeled as various “new institutionalisms” 
with different flavors within economics, political science, and sociology. Some observers 
disagree with such simplification (Nielsen 2001), and most would acknowledge that there are 
boundary-crossing elements in most practical uses of each approach. The three forms are 
presented in the introductory chapter of this book by Guy Peters, and the question now is how to 
deal with them since space precludes us from any detailed discussion. Good examples of their 
use is found in Elinor Ostrom’s discussion of democratic (self-governing) ways of avoiding the 
tragedy of the commons (Ostrom 1990); in James March and Johan P Olsen’s analysis of 
democracy (March and Olsen 1995), and in Dietrich Rüschemeyer and colleagues’ discussion of 
economic development and democracy (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). 
Guy Peters mentions three unifying features of institutional theories. Firstly, structures matter. 
Secondly, structures have some continuity (persistence). Thirdly, structures create human 
regularity. These features are played out differently in the various institutionalisms. For instance, 
rational choice institutionalism is more open to the possibility of rapid change than are the two 
other institutionalisms. Structure matters differently to different types of actors; they may be 
changed over time and thus the regularity they create is not supposed to be stable over time. 
The main difference between rational choice and organizational theory institutionalism is rooted 
in the value system. Rational choice institutionalism is in a sense color blind. If individuals can 
agree upon a task to be solved by collective action, they may do so, and the theorist may help 
them in setting up a rule system that helps reaching their objectives, no matter what they are. 
Organizational theory institutionalism places greater demands on the anchoring of democratic 
governance in values that have a more comprehensive content, the contours of a good life, also 
materially (redistribution). 
Historical institutionalism differs from the two others. First, historical institutionalism is more 
descriptive (but that is not to say value free) and hence useful as a tool of analyzing the past, but 
less so in discussions of present and future change. Second, it has in its core understandings 
much in common with the organizational institutionalism. Though it is not formulated in these 
terms, there is a strong notion of path dependency, routines and stability, and little emphasis of 
the role of the actor. Conversely, the Rational Choice institutionalism favors change, possibilities 
of institutional design and the role of an active actor. In other words, the Rational Choice and 
Organizational institutionalisms place more emphasis on some normative aspects (change and 
stability, respectively) of the analysis, which makes them relatively more useful in the ensuing 
discussions of what democracy is about.  
Therefore, we shall reduce the complexity of the discussion by focusing on two forms 
institutionalisms: Rational choice and Organizational. So, for the remaining sections of this 
chapter, we shall let historical institutionalism wither away. We shall make use of March & 
Olsen (1989, 117-142), who discuss two ways - aggregate and integrative - of understanding 
democratic institutions; each one has a strong resemblance to the Rational choice and 
Organizational institutionalism, respectively. The first institutional system stresses competition 
between conflicting interests with an aim to creating adversarial winning coalitions, the second 
stresses integration of interests into a common good or purpose based on community. 
The aggregate perspective, in its modern version, is based on the enlightenment revolutions of 
the late 18th century in the USA and France which inspired most Western democracies as they 
unfolded during the 19th and 20th centuries, building up contractual relations between political 
actors. The aggregate perspective commences with the individual, giving him (it definitely was a 
male at that time) certain rights that protect him from undue interventions from the state, but  at 
the same time those rights make it possible for him to have a say in how the state rules the 
society. Participation in public affairs is mainly linked to material interests and mostly occurs ad 
hoc; political parties and interest organizations function as watch dogs for such interests, 
relieving the individual from the arduous task of continuously pursuing political goals. The 
political leadership is seen as an intermediary between competing material interests, always 
bound to decide along the lines supported by a majority among  politically active actors. 
Institutions and procedures are organized so that they guide actors to perform according to their 
preferences, under the assumption that any action is countered by action by other actors, thus 
creating continuous processes of weighing and counter-weighing interests. Participation in 
political life therefore is partial, and linked to an active, and mostly personal, material interest in 
the allocation of goods and values; when the issue has been settled, one withdraws from the 
scene - but one is ready whenever new initiatives are felt to be necessary. 
The integrative perspective is rooted in a republican or communal understanding of the world, 
emphasizing the need for bonds between the members of the institution to secure supra-
individual goals of survival, and the obligation for the participants to actively reinforce those 
bonds by participation in political life. So, a departure is taken from the collective, and individual 
action is judged on the basis of its contribution to the common good. In return, minorities have 
guarantees against systematic defeat by a majority. Politics in such a setting deals to a large 
extent with establishing and confirming the purposes of the collectivity and maintaining the 
support of members by securing their trust in the common good. Officials act on the basis of an 
ethic that goes beyond the individual, for example by professional norms or organizational goals 
and procedures, as in Weber’s understanding of bureaucracy. Since the overarching issue is 
persistence of the community, participation in political life is linked to continuing membership of 
a deliberating community and participants are expected to raise voice on issues beyond their 
personal material interests. 
Important elements of these two understandings are summarized in figure 1.  
 
 
  Aggregative institution Integrative institution 
The people:  cluster of individuals a group 
Will of the people: bargained  deliberated 
Base of order: exchange  reason 
Leadership:  brokerage  trusteeship 
Change:  instantaneous adaptation 
Majority rule: dominant  curbed by norms 
Policy outcome: allocation of resources shared purpose & trust 
Loyalty of agents: incentive compatibility professional integrity 
 
Fig. 1. Aggregate and Integrative Institutions  
Based on March and Olsen (1989, 118-119) 
 
The traditional, democratic version of the aggregate institution is national parliamentary 
democracy where representatives are elected for parliamentary sessions in order to decide on 
matters that involve the allocation of scarce resources. The development of political parties and 
interest organizations as important intermediaries in such a system is well known for this 
audience and need no further detailing here. The idea is that once representatives are elected, 
citizens need not continually worry about their interests; these are taken care of by the 
representatives. However, some activity by the electorate is possible and desired for example via 
expressions of demands made through the mass media and various organizations, plus personal 
contacts, if necessary, in staged meetings in the constituency. As a matter of fact, too much 
activity on part of the electorate will destabilize the functioning of the system because it gets 
overloaded by communication. Discussions are to be made between representatives, not between 
representatives and electorate. The voters are supposed to wait with their final judgment until the 
next election day - and then inattentive representatives are punished by not being re-elected. 
There are instruments of communication besides the vote: mass media are supposed to serve as 
channels for the public at large, and, in addition, the editorials of daily papers see to it that 
political actions are commented upon. However, if the holders of parliamentary seats choose so, 
they can stay in power for a relatively extended period of time without really taking in new 
points of view from the electorate. Therefore, if a new majority takes over after an election, one 
must expect rapid changes in order to accommodate alternative points of view. 
The traditional version of the integrative model of democracy is the Greek republic where 
citizens, more or less in turn, are vested with public powers as trustees on behalf of the body of 
citizens. Carrying out these powers, however, presupposes that those who are affected by 
proposals for public action are invited to comment on and thus influence matters of their 
concern. At the same time, however, matters concerning an overarching good must also be 
furthered. The role of the trustees, then, is to secure continued deliberation between interests and 
thereby step by step advance towards common action and understanding. In the aggregate 
system, changes may come swiftly with a new majority, in the aggregate institution there will be 
few dramatic and instantaneous transformations. In small systems, members will be involved as 
often as possible. In larger systems, one must expect frequent checks on the sentiments of the 
citizens, but in addition, norms for political action are continuously linked to rationales that go 
beyond the party political ideologies. Thus professional norms may become important as carriers 
of public action over time, serving as determinants of what makes sense, what constitutes proper 
reason for intervention (or inactivity, for that matter).  
 
3. Developments in democratic affairs in European societies
Having established the perspectives of aggregative and integrative democracy, we can take a 
quick bird’s eye view of European trends in democratic governance. The overall pattern is as 
follows. Eastern Europe is strengthening its aggregate institutions by (re)introducing genuine 
party politics and parliamentary systems; in democratic terms the focus is on creating national 
parliamentary institutions, economic markets, and viable civil societies. In Western Europe, it 
seems fair to say that there is a certain pressure for aggregative democracy, first of all in the 
European Union to strengthen public control with the executive in Brussels by bolstering the 
European Parliament. Within the national boundaries, the Southern countries seem to strengthen 
aggregative democracy by reinforcing regional institutions in the form of (quasi)-parliaments 
based on party politics. In Northern Europe, however, changes come about by changes in sub-
national governance, in many countries favoring integrative institutions. And across all countries, 
international regimes are getting influential by regulating limits for suppression (Human Rights) 
or setting up organizations and procedures for supra-national policy-making (EU). 
We shall go through some of the changes in some more detail below, but space precludes an in-
depth discussion. We therefore rely on other sources which are pulling the pieces together. 
 
3.1. Changes in traditional forms
In most countries, support for political parties in terms of membership has been on the decline 
(there are exceptions to this rule with some parties, from time to time, gaining new interest), and 
in some countries there has also been a decline in participation in general elections, and a certain 
disillusionment with traditional politics (Pharr and Putnam 2000). This coincides with the 
general tendency towards the weakening of the nation state in favor of supranational regimes like 
the E.U., the system of human rights and so on, and consequently there has been a certain 
hollowing out of the powers of national parliaments (Hoffman 1995). In addition, parliaments 
have seen that the powers of national administrations and to some degree of interest 
organizations have been strengthened, at least relative to the political parties (Cerny 1990). 
One response has been a strengthening of the professional party apparatus - requests for more 
funding from the national budget (typically relative to votes at the last election). The parties’ 
increased income has enabled them to strengthen the salaried staff and thus help members of 
parliament counter the expertise of the central administration. This is what one may call an 
oligarchic organizational response: if the public does not support us, we must show our worthby 
doing a better (more professional) job, furthermore we need to strengthen the organization  to 
meet challences in terms of information processing and so on. So the basic institutional features 
remain unchallenged, and the politicians are strengthened in order better to address the people at 
a distance. 
Another response within the basic paradigm of having political parties as the main mediating 
organizational form, has been to increase participation and/or the range of choices. Some 
countries still had to lower the voting age to 18, and Switzerland finally included women in the 
electorate. But another solution focusing on the apparatus has been to let more offices be subject 
to direct election, for instance the mayor of a city could be elected by the citizens instead of by 
the town council. This is a perceptible inclusion of an integrative element: The leadership is now 
dependent on the people rather than the majority of the elected assembly - for election, but not 
for handling affairs like the budget. 
In sum, then, there is less support to collectivism in the traditional form of political parties, and 
the left-right division and hence the traditional cleavage is becoming problematic as welfare 
states reached an advanced stage. There is more focus on political leadership and the institutional 
arrangements for its creation and loyalty. Still, citizens see a need for more action by the people, 
though, and support other channels of influence, as we shall see below. 
 
3.2. Emergence of new forms
Several new forms, often not directly linked to the political parties, have emerged. Many 
countries have chosen to open up more direct channels for public participation in political 
decisions, a development which is strongly supported by the OECD. The OECD has analyzed the 
state of the art within the field (OECD 2001) and published a handbook to encourage 
governments to open up channels for more participation through better access to information, 
and more fora for consultation and participation (OECD 2001). The underlying issue for the 
OECD and for other players in the field is to enhance possibilities of deliberation for the general 
public and link its consequences of the deliberation to the decisions to be made.  
As part of creating a more informed public, many governments at all levels create web sites to 
inform people about their activities. Such sites are mostly one-way channels of information, but 
they may develop into quite sophisticated portals on public policy with links to other information 
sources (Bogason and Hegnsvad 2002). Generally, the more sophisticated these sites are, the 
more computer literacy is required, along with some knowledge about how decisions in the 
public sector are being made. Noentheless, there are ways of organizing computer screens so that 
the literacy barriers are lowered. 
Most countries strengthen channels to enable legal and professional reviews of political and 
administrative decisions. Some countries with legal systems which permit this have chosen to 
introduce more extensive court reviews, empowering courts to question decisions made by 
political bodies and - with some variation - order or recommend changes or reversal of such 
decisions. Other countries create specialized complaint systems relating to various policy issues, 
these are often based on boards presided by a judge; the other members may be citizens or 
interest representatives. Furthermore, Ombudsman-like institutions have been set up or 
strengthened in various countries (Gregory and Giddings 2000). 
Increased deliberation is, in many countries, based on the well-established procedure of hearing 
various interest organizations before a bill is made law is voted on?. Active deliberation, then, is 
restricted to organized interests; this is increasing in scope in many countries, and some have 
chosen to televise grand committee hearings and thus create an informed public which can then 
express its opinions on that basis. An organizational extension of process hearings is to create 
advisory bodies which may include members appointed by a public body, but often they are there 
on the basis of nominations made by various organized interests. At the local level, ad hoc 
citizens’ committees may be formed to institute hearings and negotiate possible policy advice to 
a body politic.  
In some countries, decision-making regarding the quality of public services is being taken from 
the bargaining forum of the political parties to the reason-based and more closed deliberative 
platform of the users of the services (Sørensen 1997). Technically, powers are being 
decentralized to the service organizations - that is schools, kindergartens, homes for the elderly, 
libraries and so on. In some countries, the users may gain influence though the creation of a 
Board of Directors for each organization, with the users in the majority, elected by and among 
the users of the organization. The boards decide on general principles for the service production 
and approve budgetary allocations and the hiring of staff. 
One further possibility is to let more political questions be directly influenced by the people. One 
version is to let citizens take initiatives for legislation, to be decided by the relevant legislature of 
local political body. This strengthens contacts with the people, but reserves the politicians the 
right to decide.. But questionsissues may also be decided by the people rather than on the 
parliamentary floor - by introducing referenda or by letting more decisions be made by 
referenda, typically grand issues like rejecting a bill in toto or joining the Euro. Another voting 
possibility is issue voting by computer access after a panel hearing.  
In sum, then, there are certain traces of more individual access and an insistence on basic rights. 
However, the organizational responses are not an enhanced version of aggregative democracy; 
the thrust of the changes is towards integrative measures, but to some degree within delimited 
publics. There is a growth in issue-orientation and a corresponding growth in differentiating 
organizations which participate in a growing network of deliberation among interests. This 
strengthens adaptation rather than quick change and puts more focus on leadership as trusteeship. 
One may say that the individual does not try to exercise his/her traditional role because it is clear 
that it will have little effect, but by organizing ad hoc one gains in strength and may later 
reorganize for new purposes. 
 
3.3. Searches for supranational democracy
Most features of democracy have for 200 years been strongly linked to the nation-state; witness 
the contents of the constitutions which generally guarantee a number of rights to permit citizens 
to perform democratic roles. But, for a long time, the Western nation-state has been declining in 
terms of autonomy. The clearest examples are found in the European Union, which from starting 
as a free trade agreement half a century ago has now developed into the European Union. 
Although it has its own unique features, the EU is approaching the status of a confederal system, 
and the member states must implement a large number of decisions made by the European 
Council and the Commission. The role of the national parliaments has declined accordingly. But 
the existing models for participation of the general public are mirrors of aggregative democracy 
(the European Parliament) plus some organizational representation (Social and Economic 
Committee and the Regional Committee). 
Other international regimes like Human Rights have focused the attention of political, 
administrative and court processes, on the rights of citizens. As a consequence, several countries 
- much to the surprise of for example some courts - have experienced that some of their 
processes have been declared in violation of Human Rights, and they have had to change such 
procedures according to specifications by the International Court in The Hague. 
Supranational changes, then, go in the direction of a traditional parliament and advanced 
deliberation between governments and NGOs (McGrew 2002), resulting in networks which are 
mainly issue-based; there are, however, a few trends in the direction of the integration of fora 
into the EU, witness the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance from 2001. 
 
3.4. Consequences in institutional terms
 A general theme arising form the developments discussed above is that new forms of democracy 
are challenging old forms which to some degree respond by incremental changes within their 
own logic. There are trends - particularly within nations and mostly in Northern Europe - 
towards a reduction of the importance of aggregative democracy and an increase in integrative 
democratic channels which together form various versions of networks for deliberation.  
Some of the changes may be interpreted as being rooted in the concept of the citizen and his or 
her relations to aggregative democracy: citizens have voting rights and use those rights to 
influence their representatives at the political assembly - based on the rules for discourse in the 
Bourgeois Society as it was established in the 19th century when democracy was introduced in 
most European countries. The people were to be heard, but its enlightened representatives would 
do the decision-making. And political parties were important intermediaries between the citizens 
and the political assemblies.  
Less so today. Maybe one could say that in the advanced countries, there is not much left to fight 
about in terms of the traditional left-right scale, the welfare state is well established and is not 
likely to go away, although it may not survive as a once-and-for-all fixed state form, as concepts 
like the Third Way (Giddens 2000) and the New Political Culture (Clark and Hoffmann-Martinot 
1998) indicate. As a consequence, the confrontations between the haves and the have-nots mean 
less, and there is, by now, not so much to bargain for as a Zero-sum game, and more to deliberate 
about, albeit often only resulting in marginal changes. Parallel to that, the general “public 
interest” is on the wane in favor of specialized interests, just as we can see a general tendency 
towards fragmentation of the advanced Western societies; this is increasingly discussed in 
professional rather than party political terms.  
To some degree, national changes are countered by international regimes which overrule some 
national rules to create equal rights. But the role of the EU is more that of  guaranteeing the 
working mechanisms of market systems than to enhance society’s solidaristic movements. Still, 
the international changes are more in the aggregative than in the integrative direction with 
individual rights much in focus. International regimes do not receive much of democratic input 
from citizens. But in so far as they develop integrative democratic mechanisms by, among 
others, the uses of the predominantly professional agendas of NGOs, they may still work to our 
satisfaction in spite of the fact that we are not involved as individual citizens. 
 
4. Competing theoretical understandings of new forms
There is a large territory of theory addressing the changes in societies from various perspectives. 
Below we present them based on an understanding of institutionalism that involves rules and 
norms for action, positions for action and the sort of order they create (Bogason 2000, chap 5). 
These elements are used in the text, but not in a special matrix-like way, they rather permeate the 
discussion. The schools of thought we discuss are deliberative democracy, associative 
democracy and various uses of civil society, and transnational democracy. 
 
4.1. Deliberative democracy
Deliberative democracy is a very broad category and it is found in many variations, see for 
example Bohman and Rehg (1997). In its most general sense, deliberation is a basic ordering 
principle in any democratic system; election campaigns and discussions in parliamentary 
sessions are all part of a deliberative system specifying roles in and purpose of the discourse as 
well as rules of procedure.  
There are other versions of creating discussions about the decisions of elected bodies and their 
administrative agencies. Hearings instituted by public administrations have been set up in order 
to secure compliance with future administrative rules and avoid mistakes about the actual state of 
affairs among those affected by the rules-to-be. From that perspective, there is not much new in 
demands for deliberation, it is a processual prerequisite for aggregative democratic processes to 
function. But if we restrict the scope of circumstances regulating the processes of deliberation (as 
would be the case in most hearings), we get a system whose ideals are less easy to fulfill. 
A starting point often used for making the deliberative concept more precise is Habermas’ social 
theory which suggests three means of social coordination: power, money and norms (solidarity) 
(Eriksen 1996). In that context, deliberation is a means to avoid one-sided uses of power  and 
money (both of which are so much present in the state and the market), and possibly to reinforce 
and (re)activate various channels of solidarity. It may be understood as a prerequisite to the use 
of voting so that rationales for stances are made clear - the vote itself tells nothing about why it 
was cast. Habermas’ own demands on deliberation are quite strict because of the requirements 
mandated on the users of a public space. For practical purposes, this may be summarized along 
the lines that clear communication, mutual recognition of the right to speak, truthfulness and 
sincerity of the speaker are required to make deliberation in the public space valid and thus have 
ideal speech conditions (Fox and Miller 1995, 116-118). In other words, the participants in 
deliberative democracy are put on an equal footing when they exercise their democratic rights. 
No-one except themselves can exclude them, nor can any one select them for preferential 
treatment. No media, political representatives or appointed leaders have more say during the 
deliberative processes. 
Other theorists have relaxed those claims. In particular, the demands above seem easily to 
exclude “tough” decisions within politics - situations where the uses of various means of power 
are likely, as are uses of information that is communicated from one perspective only, i.e. with a 
strategic aim. One can then reduce the demands so that arguments must appeal to common 
interests among participants, and at least appear credible in terms of factual statements and 
appear to be made in good faith. On such a basis, deliberations can lead to agreements about 
procedures to carry on a process, recognition of other parties and respect for their arguments, and 
possibly, but not necessarily, consensus. In addition, these deliberations, possibly conflicting, 
may take place in various settings like hearings, juries, town meetings as well as within 
legislatures and associations  (Warren 2002, 183-185). 
Deliberative democracy, then, demands the establishment of fora for participation, and access for 
participants to any forum that touches upon circumstances of their lives, to counter decisions 
made on the basis of power and money. It requires participants to be true to norms of 
participation (and silence) in order for a satisfactory democratic order appears. It works well with 
aggregative democracy in the polis, but increasingly it may be seen as a “aggregation-plus” in 
more comprehensive democratic systems, where more channels are created for participation to 
make up for the inability of elected bodies to follow the details of a complicated state-run 
society. 
 
4.2. Associative Democracy and Uses of Civil Society
In civil society, people are assumed to associate with another for collective action as they see fit, 
in order to solve problems and thus create order within problems which the market or the state do 
not alleviate. Theorists often see a vibrant, mostly local, civil society as a prerequisite for a 
democratic system to be workable; de Tocqueville is of course often quoted in that connection 
(Tocqueville 1945), but the democratization of Eastern Europe triggered discussions along those 
lines, even before the fall of the Berlin Wall (Keane 1988). However, conceptions of civil society 
are not necessarily restricted to the local setting: the globalization of the economy has lead to 
discussions about an augmented necessity for NGOs, which - at least in theory - can sustain a 
non-market related discourse about world affairs, and without domination by strong states. They 
may create tensions in so far as they tend to address issues that previously were reserved for the 
nation state to deal with; thus they may be seen as a threat by autarchic states (He 2002). 
Historically, most democratic states were, originally, quite minimalist, and therefore the 
population formed associations for health insurance, social institutions for children and the 
elderly, and organization of the workplace. In addition, many associations were formed, mostly 
as cooperatives, for local production like dairies and slaughterhouses (Bogason 1992), and some 
were formed to prove that workers could themselves organize production (Carter 2002, 229-
230).  
Most of the recent changes in democratic affairs border on the distinction between the 
democratic state and civil society and the roles citizens play within those spheres. In traditional 
liberal democracy, the political representatives function on the basis of particular organizations - 
political parties - which much have functioned as links to the lives of private citizens. They 
organize themselves regarding state affairs in the parties, and some of the members are then 
chosen to have an active role within the bodies politic until the next elections. But the scope of 
the welfare state has become so broad that many activities which earlier belonged to the sphere 
of civil society, have become engulfed by the active state. The representatives of the political 
parties in the parliament and in local governments are not in a position to control these activities 
in any detail; that would result in serious overload. The citizens, on the other hand, seem not to 
be satisfied with the bureaucratic setup of welfare state institutions, and in order to ameliorate 
communication between those affected and the political/administrative system, citizens have step 
by step become more active in the various advisory and directing positions, particularly in the 
localities. But at the national level one has also in some countries seen an increase in the uses of 
interest organizations in advisory as well as administrative bodies. 
So, if the conception of civil society under the 19th century  Western liberal democracy was to 
see it as an alternative to the state, the growth of the welfare state first reduced the role of civil 
society; then changed the boundary between political and civil by permeating it and redefining 
the possible roles of the citizenry vis-à-vis its institutions, e.g. by giving them extended powers 
as users (Bogason 1996). Those roles often are non-party-political, but issue-specific. They have 
distinct aspects of integrative democracy built into their rationales for existence: They are meant 
to create agreement rather than dissent and leadership is mostly a matter of trust.  
This is where they differ from most of the activities in the various forms of social movements 
which have strong elements of contestation built into them, and therefore they often are 
dissolved when their purpose is fulfilled or recognized to be non-reachable. Social movements 
are self-organizing while the new roles for advisors and users are regulated by statutes set up by 
the bodies of the political system.  
A special discussion of the proper role of organizing on the border between the political system 
and civil society has emerged under the heading of associative democracy. Principles of 
associative democracy are based on such involvement of actors in formal organizations to solve 
problems requiring some degree of collective action.  
Many associations of the 19th century were formed in order to alleviate some negative 
consequences of untamed market forces. One might say that some deliberative principles of 
general parliamentary democracy were organized into systems based on ideas of maintaining 
civil society. The historical development has means less need for such associations, but the very 
process of bureaucratizing activities formerly run by associations has created a call for re-
introducing associations in order to increase the responsiveness of service organizations to 
particular demands within segments of the population. The state is “strong thumbs, no fingers” 
(Lindblom 1977, 65), it is relatively insensitive to variegated demands; that being the case, 
people may wish to organize according to their particular tastes in services and form particular 
associations to serve them. This is the anti-state reaction which has been elaborated in theoretical 
terms by several theorists, some focusing on service organization (Hirst 1994), some on other 
aspects, particularly along neo-corporatist trends (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). 
Associationalism in Hirst’s version goes quite far: It is intended to combine the individual choice 
of liberalism and the public provision of collectivism. Thus voluntary self-governing associations 
become the primary vehicle of democratic societal governance. Hirst recommends changing 
governance gradually into a federated system of elected bodies relying on associations for the 
implementation of policy principles; this is to counter political failure of accountability and 
responsiveness to public influence and centralized professionalism by dependence on the 
administrative machine which diminishes alternatives and choice (Hirst 1994, 3-6). Associalism 
should promote activism by users, alternatives in service production, responsiveness by service 
producers, accountability by the management of the service production and legitimacy of the 
organization by making sure that it is rooted in the group of users. 
One might argue that this perspective is distinctively British, based on Thatcherism and after, 
and that other democratic systems have created new channels of influence of the sort we have 
discussed above; therefore the normative call is system specific (Bogason 2000). The more local 
services are put under the influence of users by various new channels, the more the ideas of 
associative democracy are being approached without the demands on those users to invest in and 
run buildings and other fixed capital. 
 
4.3. Transnational democracy
The nation-state is becoming permeated by market forces, from international politics, and even 
from NGOs. Market forces are mostly subsumed under the heading of globalization; 
international political forces often are called internationalization, while there seems to be little 
agreement about a catch-all phrase for the international civil society. Still, the common thrust is a 
reduction of the role and the influence of the national state. In globalization, the states roll back 
their regulation of international capital movements in order to keep the interest of locating the 
business within their territories; they do, however, increase the visibility of such movements by 
reducing the number of off-shore tax havens. They ease the lives of the employees of multi-
national firms by setting up attractive tax packages for transient personnel, whose income taxes  
are in effect reduced to the smallest denominator among the Western societies. Within politics, 
some states are working on establishing a supra-national level which is close to a confederation - 
the EU, whose characteristics we do not have to go through in detail here. Furthermore various 
regimes limit the possibilities for national states to make certain decisions. Several NGOs are 
active in pushing this development further and integrating more states in such regimes, thereby 
reducing their powers. Thus there are elements of associative democracy built into the emerging 
system, particularly regarding the role of NGOs (McGrew 2002).  
On most counts, individuals do not have access to influencing international affairs and therefore, 
the changes represent neither progress in traditional, liberal democratic terms nor in Paul Hirst’s 
associative terms. Individuals cannot access multi-national firms; they can, to some extent, make 
their voices heard via exits from the international market - as in the fur trade, or by specific 
action as in the Brent Spar case. There are no international political parties to become a member 
of, but political parties may set up international cooperative measures and in the EU, they form 
sub-groups for use in the parliament. There are to some degree membership possibilities in 
NGOs by becoming a member of the national branch, but the international activities are mostly 
undertaken by the NGO version of a corporate headquarter. 
Democracy, then, is multi-faceted. Intergovernmental cooperation is based on nation-states 
participating on behalf of their citizens. Only within the EU is there a parliamentary system 
involved, still with limited powers. Interestingly enough, a revision seems to be in the direction 
of establishing an aggregative democracy along the traditional parliamentary lines, as when the 
parliaments were introduced in the 19th century. Apart from that, the development is more in the 
direction of extended deliberation, based on a number of governmental and non-governmental 
organizations which channel processes and roles. The general direction seems to have more of 
integrative than of aggregative democracy in it. 
 
5. Towards Institutional Dynamics: Multi-layered or nested systems
The basic and simple tenets of institutional theory - that institutions matter, they persist and 
create regularity - hold true: Western parliaments and local governments have not been removed; 
they do legislate and they process demands; their election procedures are not much changed; and 
they have maintained their relations to the (mostly) subservient administration. That said, there is 
significant variation in how institutions matter in terms of influence; they only persist to a certain 
degree, and they do not create regularity that cannot be changed at some scale. 
Are we witnessing processes where the organizational pattern of the 20th century - political 
parties, trade unions, and other centralized types of organization - are withering away in favor of 
supra-national regimes and local individualization? New all-encompassing structures and local 
mavericks? These are important, if provocative, questions, and useful in triggering an 
investigation of the changes towards more compartmentalized decision-making. Within each of 
such compartments, there is less need for polarization among competing interests and more need 
for incremental deliberation to create continuing consensus on what is to be done. But there is an 
inherent danger that the compartments would fight one another in attempts to get scarce 
resources. The organizations that are to cut across such factions and secure the public good - 
parliaments, local governments councils - tend to get weaker, as we have seen above, so there is 
a risk that some factions win resources in a 0-sum game.  
Such a development is welcomed by those who believe in a stronger participatory democracy - a 
system where participation in and by itself is deemed important. They see the traditional 
representative system of government as wanting in legitimacy: those who are elected are not 
sufficiently in contact with their constituency - for instance, most political parties lack new 
young members so that they reflect an older part of the population rather than the population at 
large. So, while such critics do recognize the efficiency of such a system in making material 
decisions, their claim is that it does not engage citizens sufficiently in the political processes and 
therefore does not establish a proper - i.e. extended - democratic relationship between politicians 
and citizens. By getting involved in the new channels the citizens get an understanding beyond 
the task at hand and thus create a more responsible citizenship - not just demanding users - over 
time.  
However, the changes are unattractive for those who see the development in contemporary 
society as strengthening the influence of individuals who do not support the notion of social 
solidarity or cohesion in the society, phenomena that guarantee a minimum standard of living for 
those who are endowed with fewer skills for a competitive job market. On the other hand, the 
way the interplay seems to develop - in the direction of networks in which the participants adhere 
to the principles of integrative democracy with extended deliberation and respect for the past - 
may secure the interests of the weak more than theory would at first sight predict.  
Above, three generalizing  approaches to modern democracy - deliberative, associative, and 
transnational - have been discussed in institutional terms on the basis of the conceptual 
distinctions between aggregative and deliberative democracy. At the most general level of 
analysis, aggregative democracy seems to be reduced in importance at the local level, and new 
integrative measures based on various understandings of deliberation are introduced. At the 
national level, parliaments are maintained, but they are curbed by international regimes, and 
within the country, they are challenged in several ways. At the international level there are mixed 
signals; there are a few signs of allocative democracy in a confederated system, and some 
deliberative measures by more uses of NGOs. In sum, most of the changes are in the direction of 
reinforced integrative democracy based on extended deliberations among more organizations, 
some public, some private, and quite a few hybrids between the public and the private sector. 
Open conflicts are avoided, and the discussions are based on common trust among the 
participants. 
In this instrumental way, institutional theory is helpful in conceptualizing and thus ordering 
empirical changes in democratic affairs. Are those changes then, in themselves, institutional 
changes? Are we witnessing profound changes in our democratic institutions? And what are we 
to think about such changes? 
If integrative democracy is increasing in importance, let us return to the principles of an 
integrative institution (figure 1 above). The following characteristics, then, may be hypothesized 
to be present in the resulting systems of democracy. Within each of the particularized political 
bodies, emphasis is on reaching decisions as a group (if there are elections, they are not party 
politicized); the processes in the body are characterized by deliberated reason in order to reach a 
common decision (rather than factions bargaining their particular interests); changes come over 
time as step-by step adaptations of (local) processes (rather than swift turnabouts following latest 
fad or fashion); the majority is reluctant to use its powers against strong resistance from the 
minority, and the well-functioning organization builds up an understanding of common purpose 
rather that just focusing maximizing for example a short-run factor like maximizing a budget. At 
the local level, such an organization would also respect the professional role of the service 
institution it presides over instead of just instantly following any impulse from complaining 
users. 
Institutional theory, then, is usable in structuring analysis of democratic change. No matter how 
conceived, the analyst is guided towards examining norms, rules, positions and processes 
shaping relations among actors. How the analysis takes place depends on the perspective used, 
and here we may find significant variation among approaches. So institutions matter, but so do 
approaches. Where you stand depends on where you sit; the analysis is dependent on the 
normative stance behind the approach and on the particular elements brought into play by the 
approach. 
On the normative side, institutuional theories are less helpful per se. But they do help us 
clarifying what principles of order are gaining in importance. To put it differently: We have 
above seen "democracy" as an institution - that is, the old aggregative democracy. We have 
found a number of changes in the direction of other rationales - mainly integrative - for 
democratic behavior, because new channels of influence are being created. To some degree they 
replace the old aggregative system, to some degree they compete with it. I see this as a 
complication of our understanding of democratic societies: New institutional forms come up, and 
"democracy" changes into something conceptually more rich than it was. This may be 
understood as institutional development.  
For good or for bad? Seen from the perspective of the aggregate system, the changes are 
problematic because the rules of the game change and political parties which formed the 
backbone for the system are not apt for such change, nor are the old interest organizations 
involved in neo-corporatistic cooperation. But seen from the perspective of active citizens, the 
changes may be seen as a bonus because new alternatives for political influence are offered. 
Back to the two basic institutionalisms. On the theoretical side, the question now is how to cope 
with a dynamic world with a theory that often assumes stability. If we put aside the sociological 
version of institutional theory and make stronger use of the Rational Choice version, one could 
point to elements that challenge the general picture of stability. Some might work around the 
problem by distinguishing between institutions and organizations. That is, the comprehensive 
democratic system may be the institution (whether in value or structural terms) and the various 
instruments through which democratic politics works--parties, interest groups, and so on--are 
better understood as organizations. This is the distinction that some make between the rules of 
the game and the players in the game.  
Such a distinction between institution and organization would work in some cases, and maybe in 
some instances of the changes of democracy. We then have to take recourse to a multi-layered 
understanding of democracy - rather that having traditional democracy as the institution and new 
forms as "organizations". One might say that institutions are nested within one another - with 
traditional, aggregative democracy as one overarching system ("dominant" and "symbolic") and 
other, integrative forms as emergent and to some degree working in the "shadow" of the 
traditional form which at the same time is becoming undermined within some of its normal fields 
of application.  
One might label the result a “Network Democracy”, whose elements still lack some 
conceptualizing and theorizing, but on the other hand it certainly also demands more empirical 
research. It goes without saying that those two demands are mutually dependent and should be 
met by a supply hand in hand. 
 
 
Note. The author would like to thank Marianne Antonsen, Allan Dreyer Hansen, Radmila 
Milkovic Rasmussen, B Guy Peters, Jon Pierre and Eva Sørensen for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft, and they are relieved of any responsibility for the remaining deficiencies of the 
product.  
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